INDO-CHINA RELATIONS : POST DOKLAM STANDOFF

Introduction:

1. The 2017 China India border standoff or Doklam standoff refers to the military border standoff between the Indian armed forces and the People's Liberation Army of China over construction of a road in Doklam, known as Donglang, or Donglang Caochang (meaning Donglang pasture or grazing field), in Chinese.

On 16 Jun 2017 Chinese troops with construction vehicles and road-building equipment began extending an existing road southward in Doklam, a territory which is claimed by both China as well as India's ally Bhutan. On 18 Jun 2017, around 270 Indian troops, with weapons and two bulldozers, entered Doklam to stop the Chinese troops from constructing the road. On 28 August, both India and China announced that they had withdrawn all their troops from the face-off site in Doklam.

Background

2. Doklam is an area disputed between China and Bhutan located near their tri-junction with India. Unlike China and Bhutan, India does not claim Doklam but supports Bhutan's claim. China's claim on Doklam is based on the 1890 Convention of Calcutta between China and Britain.

3. China asserts that by this Convention, the starting point of the Sikkim-Tibet border is "Mount Gipmochi on the Bhutan frontier" and that this clearly defines the tri-junction point. As per Chinese claims, Doklam is located in the Xigaze area of Tibet, bordering the state of Sikkim. However Bhutan was not a party to the Convention.

4. In 1949, Bhutan signed a treaty with India giving allowance to India to guide its diplomatic and defence affairs. In 2007, the treaty was superseded by a new Friendship Treaty that replaced the provision that made it mandatory for Bhutan to take India's guidance on foreign policy, provided broader sovereignty but also stated in its Article 2.In keeping with the abiding ties of close friendship and cooperation between Bhutan and India, the Government of the Kingdom of Bhutan and the Government of the Republic of India shall cooperate closely with each other on issues relating to their national interests.

5. Bhutan and China have held 24 rounds of boundary talks since they began in 1984, with notable agreements reached in 1988 and 1998, the latter also prohibiting the use of force and encouraging both parties to strictly adhere to peaceful means. In the early 2000s, China built a road up the Sinchela pass (in undisputed territory) and then over the plateau (in disputed territory), leading up to the Doka La pass, until reaching within 68 metres distance to the Indian border post on the Sikkim border. Here, they constructed a turn-around facilitating vehicles to turn back. This road has been in existence at least since 2005. It is the southward extension of this road that has sparked the 2017 standoff.

Events

6. On 16 Jun 2017 Chinese troops with construction vehicles and road-building  quipment began extending an existing road southward on the Doklam plateau.

7. On 18 Jun 2017, around 270 Indian troops, with weapons and two bulldozers, entered Doklam to stop the Chinese troops from constructing the road.

8. On 29 Jun 2017, Bhutan protested to China against the construction of a road in the disputed territory. According to the Bhutanese government, China attempted to extend a road that previously terminated at Doka La towards the Bhutan Army camp at Zornpelri near the Jampheri Ridge 2 km to the south. That ridge, viewed as the border by China but as wholly within Bhutan by both Bhutan and India, extends eastward approaching India's highly-strategic Siliguri corridor. The Bhutanese border was reportedly put on high alert and border security was tightened as a result of the growing tensions.

9. On 3 Jul 2017, China Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Geng Shuang stated that former Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru accepted the 1890 Britain–China treaty.

10. On 5 Jul 2017, the Chinese government said that it had for the past 24 months a basic consensus with Bhutan that Doklam belongs to China, and there was no dispute between the two countries.

11. On 19 Jul 2017, China renewed its call for India to withdraw its troops from Doklam.

12. On 24 Jul 2017, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi told reporters that it is very clear who is right and who is wrong in the standoff in Doklam, and that even senior Indian officials have publicly said that Chinese troops have not intruded into Indian Territory. "In other words, India admitted that it has entered Chinese territory. The solution to this issue is simple, which is that they behave themselves and withdraw," Wang said.

13. On 2 Aug 2017, the Chinese foreign ministry released a 15-page official position

statement. According to this document, there were still over 40 Indian troops and one bulldozer in Doklam (Donglang) region. Beijing accused India of using Bhutan as "a pretext" to interfere and impede the boundary talks between China and Bhutan.

14. On 3 Aug 2017, China charged with four reasons that "India is certainly not for peace" though it always puts peace on its lips.

15. On 8 Aug 2017, Chinese diplomat Wang Wenli claimed that Bhutan had conveyed to China through diplomatic channels that the area of the standoff is not its territory, saying, "After the incident, the Bhutanese made it very clear to us that the place where the trespassing happened is not Bhutan‘s territory." On the next day, the Bhutanese government denied this, saying over the phone "Our position on the border issue of Doklam is very clear" and referring to the government‘s 29 June statement.

16. On 9 Oct 2017 China announced that it is ready to maintain peace at frontiers with India reacting to Indian Defence Minister Nirmala Sitharaman‘s visit to Nathu La.

Bhutanese Reactions

17. After issuing a press statement on 29 June, the Bhutanese government and media maintained a studious silence. The Bhutanese clarified that the road on which China was building a road was "Bhutanese territory" that was being claimed by China, and it is part of the on-going border negotiations. It also defended the policy of silence followed by the Bhutanese government, saying "Bhutan does not want India and China to go to war, and it is avoiding doing anything that can heat up an already heated situation." However, ENODO Global, having done a study of social media interactions in Bhutan, recommended that the government should "proactively engage" with citizens and avoid a disconnect between leaders and populations.

ENODO found considerable anxiety among the populace regarding the risk of war between India and China, and the possibility of annexation by China similar to that of Tibet in 1951.

Disengagement

18. On 28 Aug 2017, India and China announced that they had agreed to pull their troops back from the face-off in Doklam. By the end of the day, it was reported that that the withdrawal was completed.

19. The Indian troops withdrew back to their original positions at their outpost at Doka La, located in a militarily advantageous position on the Bhutanese border, less than 500 meters away down the ridge slope.

20. Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) of India released a press statement stating that

India and China had mutually agreed to disengage. It said that India and China had maintained diplomatic communication in recent weeks and that India was able to convey its "concerns and interests". In Beijing, the foreign ministry spokeswoman said that the Chinese forces on site have verified that the Indian troops pulled out, and implied that Chinese troop numbers would bereduced. She said that the  hinese troops would continue to patrol the area, to garrison it and to exercise "sovereign rights". However, she made no mention of road-building activities. On 29 August, Bhutan welcomed the disengagement and hoped that it would lead to the  maintenance of peace and tranquillity as well as status quo along the borders.

21. On 5 September, Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Xi Jinping held hourlong discussions on the side-lines of the BRICS summit. They agreed on a "forward-looking" approach and vowed to make efforts to ensure that situations like the Doklam standoff do not recur. They reaffirmed that maintaining peace and tranquillity in the border areas was essential for the relations between the two countries.

Conclusion

22. India‘s interests lie in arriving at the immediate demarcation of the LAC, followed by the early resolution of the territorial dispute. It is towards these goals that India must steer the course of future meetings with China‘s political and military authorities.